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THANK YOU SIR, MAY I HAVE ANOTHER; THE ISSUE OF 
THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF LOW INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDITS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
John Baber* 
I. Introduction 
The Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (L1HTC) program is 
currently the nation's largest federal subsidy for the development and 
rehabilitation of affordable housing,l having created or preserved 
over 2.5 million housing units and distributed over $7.5 billion in fed-
eral tax credits to developers of and investors in affordable housing 
from the program's inception in 1986 through 2007.2 Howevcr, de-
spite its monumental size and impact, the program has some poten-
tially fatal flaws that threaten the long-term financial and physical 
viability of the very affordable housing that it creates, and threatens 
the health of the neighborhoods that it is created in.~ Affordable 
housing projects built today are routinely constructed in communities 
that are already geographically segregated, overburdened with debt 
due to unnecessarily high up-front development fees and other debts, 
and simultaneously limited in the amount of rental income they can 
generate.4 
In many ways, these building practices do not benefit the communi-
ties they are built in, and can lead to an unsustainable economic situa-
tion whcJ'e the project's ability to fund its ongoing maintenance and 
capital improvements (new roof'), systems, etc.) are put in serious 
jeopardy because most of its revenue goes towards paying its operating 
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1. Megan Ballard, Profiting from Poverty: The Comj)elilion Betwun For-Profit and 
NonproJit Developers for Low Income Hou~ing Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L:J. 211, 
212 (2003). 
2. NAT'l COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, STATE HFA FACTBOOK: 2010 
NCSHA ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS 92, 100 (2012). 
3. See irifra Part IV. 
4. See Barry Zigas, Learning from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit: Building a 
New Socia/Investment Mode~ 9 CMTY. DEV. INV. REv. 47, 54 (2013). Zigas 
states that ~there is considerable value "leakage" caused by layers of spon-
sors, syndicators, lawyers, accountants, and others needed t.o create, track, 
and document the credit." Id. 
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expenses and pre-existing debt.5 Remarkably the state-run system of 
administering the LIHTC and the federal tax credit statute it"elf, al-
lows, and in some ways, indirectly encourages developers to construct 
affordable housing projects in already segregated communities. 6 Fur-
thennore, while these projects have a good shot at short-term profit-
ability for the developers, they have a slim chance of being able to 
financially support themselves in the long-term - much to the detri-
ment of the tenants who live there and the communities in which the 
projects are located.7 
This article will focus on. the issues that arise in the administration 
of the LIHTC in the State of Maryland. Part II of this paper will re-
view the history of the LIHTC program and identify the defining fea-
tures of the program - some of which are at the heart of the 
program's problems.8 Part III will identify how this program works in 
Maryland - from its state-specific requirements to its application and 
administration.9 Part N will address some ofthe problematic issues in 
the LIHTC program: how the allocation of the tax credits has not 
alleviated geographic segregation, and how some of the program's key 
features have been misapplied by both private developers and govern-
mental interests to the point that the program's central mission is no 
longer being adequately fulfilled. 10 Finally, Part V will offer some sug-
gestions for ways to improve the long-term financial prospect." of the 
atfordable housing constructed under the program, including pri-
vate/non-profit and private/governmental partnerships that will 
strengthen the program. l ! 
Like most federal government programs, the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit program has gone through a full maturation cycle in the 
years since its inception, and looks much different today than it did 
when it was createa almost thirty years ago.l~ In order to find out 
where the program should be headed, it is first necessary to see from 
where it came. 
5. See infra Part IV.S.C. 
6. SeeThe Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 26 U.S.c. § 42 (2006); Md. QT~ali­
jied Allocatiun Plan for the Allocatiun of Fed. Low Income Housing 'Fax Credits, 
MD. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND CMIT. DEV. Gul. 8, 2014), http://www.dhcd 
.maryland.gov /Websitc/ programs/ rhf/Documen ts/MD _ QAP July _8_2014 
.pdf [hereinafter QAP]. 
7. See infra Part N. 
8. &e infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. See infra Part N. 
11. See infra Part V. 
12. See generally William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Model, 
2002 WIS. L. REv. 377, 396-98 (2002) (discussing the evolution of the fcd-
eral Urban Renewal program, Community Action Program, and the rise of 
state-run Public Housing Authorities). 
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II. The History and Purpose of the LIHTC Program 
Federal and state governments have "been in the business of provid-
ing subsidized rental housing since the mid-1930's."13 Government 
has used a multitude of programs to address housing affordability is-
sues over the last century, from directly providing aflordable housing 
with the public housing programs of the 1930's-60's,14 to direct renter 
subsidies with the Section 8 rental assistance program in the 1970's.15 
In the mid-1980's, Congress turned to private housing developers to 
facilitate the creation of affordable housing when it enacted the 
LIHTC program as part of the comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 
1986. 10 
The LIHTC program has somewhat loose requirements at the fed-
eral level; because the hallmark of the program is that it is to be ad-
ministered by state housing agencies. 17 "The federal government 
allocates LlHTC program credits annually to each state based on pop-
ulation,"18 and administers the distribution of the credits through the 
Treasury Department. J9 In 2010, the federal government made availa-
ble $2.10 per capita worth of tax credits for each state, totaling $12 
million available to Maryland.20 
The tax credits are distributed as a whole to state "allocating agen-
cies" (which usually are states' housing finance agencies), leaving the 
decision about how to specifically distribute the tax credits to the indi-
vidual states.21 Each designated state allocating agency must create 
and act pursuant to a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) that is used to 
distribute the tax credits, giving preference to projects serving the low-
est income tenants.22 The QAP creates an orderly method by which 
13. Ballard, supra note 1, at 212. 
14. See Zigas, supra note 4, at 48. 
15. Id. See also Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1706(e) (l974) (current version at 42 U.s.C. § 1437(f) (2014). 
16. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 101 Stat. 2189 (1986) 
(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 42). 
17. 26 U.S.C. § 42. 
18. Kimberly C. Moore, The Federal Low-lncome Housing Tax Credit Program: 25 
Years of Public-PriVltle Partnerships, PERSPECTIVES ON REAL ESTATE NEWSLETTER 
(Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP), Summer (2011). 
19. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community RcvitaUzation: Applying the 
Fai:r Housing Act to the Low-lncome Housing Tax Credit Program, 58 VANO. L. 
REv. 1747, 1777 (2005). 
20. Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-2 C.D. 617. In 2010, Maryland distributed over $9 
million to ten affordable housing projects. See 2010 Recipient List, MD. DEPT. 
or Hous. & CM1Y. DEV., http://dhcd.maryland.gov/Website/progra.ms/ 
lihtc/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
21. Marc Smith & Anne Williamson, The Low income Housing 'Tax Credit and in-
ner-City Revitali'l.ation, 35 Hous. & SOC'y 129, 131 (2008). "The LIHTC pro-
gram requires substantial state or local government action." Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011,1014 (1997). 
22. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (m)(l)(A)(ii). 
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developers can submit applications and ultimately compete for the tax 
credits by articulating the selection criteria by which projects are cho-
sen and the procedure used to monitor ongoing compliance with the 
program's requirements.2~ This allows states to use the federal tax 
credits to create and implement policies that directly address a state's 
specific housing needs, all with minimal federal interference.24 
Most of the specifics of how the LIHTC program works are deter-
mined at the state level. The next section explains how the LIHTC 
program is administered at the state level in Maryland, why it is so 
desirable for developers, and how it facilitates the creation of afforda-
ble housing. 
III. How the LIHTC Program Works 
A. How Tax Credits Fund the Development of Affordable Housing 
LIHTCs are essentially a development trade-off: a public subsidy 
that can be applied directly to the building costs of a project in ex-
change for a dedicated amount of affordable housing units in that 
project. 25 The affordable units are then rent-restricted and subject to 
income limitations that ensure low-income tenants have the opportu-
nity to live in these units.26 These tax credits "attract capital to an 
investment that is otherwise not attractive or economically desirable," 
and allow for affordable housing to be built even if the pr~ject's fi-
nances are tight. 27 
The main benefit of the tax credit program to developers is that 
there is a ready market of investors that are familiar with the product 
and willing to purchase credits, resulting in substantially lower perma-
nent deht on project .. than otherwise could be achieved. The state 
can issue tax credits to a project developer with an annual value of up 
to nine percent of the total cost of the development project, exclud-
ing the land costs, which is available to investors over a period of ten 
years, totaling 70 percent of the total qualified basis of the building.28 
The qualified basis of the building is the total development cost of 
that portion of the building that will qualify for LIHTCs, induding 
developer fees, but minus land costs.29 
23. ld. 
24. See Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 131. 
25. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014. 
26. ld. 
27. Zigas, supra note 4, at 50. 
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (b) ([ )(A); QAP, supra note 6, at 2; Zigas, supra note 4, at 
49. 
29. MD. DEPT. OF Hous. & CM"IY. DEV., MULTIFAMII.Y RENTAL FIN. PROGRAM 
GUIDE: ATTACHMENT TO MD. QUAL/FlED ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE ALLOCA· 
TION OF FEDERAL Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT:; 32 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter Program Guide). 
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For federal income tax purposes, LIHTCs are used to offset the 
taxes that for-profit taxpayers would otherwise owe on unrelated 
earned income, "dollar for dollar" and are not mere "deductions" 
from gross income. 3o Developers "sell" such credits by permitting for-
profit taxpayers, usually corporations, to become investor/owners in 
the entity that owns a LlHTC-eligible project in return for a much-
needed cash infusion of capital into that entity that can help to make 
a financially difficult project possible.31 Once the prqject is com-
pleted the "tax credits begin to flow to the investors who purchased 
them."32 
The main benefit of the tax credit to the public is that it requires a 
developer to dedicate a set amount of rent-restricted units per project 
for tenants who meet certain low-income requirements. 33 Federal law 
requires specific income limits for the set-aside units: either 20 per-
cent of the total units in a project must be occupied by tenant.." earn-
ing 50 percent or less of the Area Median Income (AMI) (known as a 
20/50 split) or at least 40 percent of the unit.'; must be occupied by 
tenant.'; earning 60 percent or less of the AMI (known as a 40/60 
split).34 The rent~ for the units are established by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually, 
based on the number of bedrooms in a unit, and may not exceed 30 
percent of the income ceiling.35 A developer must commit to main-
taining compliance with these rent restrictions for a minimum of 30 
years (subject to earlier termination as discussed later in this article), 
although states are allowed to dictate longer terms.36 The United 
States Internal Revenue Code (the Code) requires that each project's 
affordability restrictions be recorded in an "extended low-income 
housing commitment" (often called a "Land Use Restriction Agree-
ment").~7 Currendy, Maryland requires an additional 10 years of rent 
restrictions, for a total of forty years, but permits an owner to opt-out 
of the program restrictions after 15 years if there is a buyer willing to 
pay an above market-rate purchase price that must be approved by the 
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD).38 In 
practice, this provision effectively prevents any project from leaving 
the program after 15 years. 
30. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014-15, 
31. fd. 
32, Ballard, supra note 1, at 219, 
33. Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Lyjects oj" Low income Housing 
Tax Credit Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 J. 01'- PUB. ECON. 654, 660 
(2009) . 
34. 26 V.S.c. § 42 (g)(1)-(2). 
35. See QAP, supra note 6, at 2. 
36. Orfield, supra note 19, at 1777, 
37. Zigas, supra note 4, at 51. 
38. See QAP, supra note 6, at 2, 
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B. The QAP: How Tax Credits are Administm-ed by the State 
The creation of the QAP is a multi-step process where private inter-
ests, elected officials, and members of the pubJic help to shape Mary-
land's procedure for allocating LIHTC.39 Each state is required to 
create a QAP,40 which in Maryland is created by the DHCD, along 
with public input, and amended yearly as necessary, after an opportu-
nity for public comment and a public hearing. 41 The final draft of the 
amended QAP is then submitted to the Governor for approvalY M-
ter the approval of the QAP, the DHCD, designated as the agency that 
distributes the tax credits, monitors ongoing compliance with the 
state and federal requirements of the program - most importantly 
that a particular project maintains the minimum required percentage 
of affordable units for the agreed upon period of time. 43 
The QAP is used to promulgate the housing priorities that the state 
deems appropriate from time to time, be it elderly housing, housing 
for people with disabilities, or low-income family housing.44 The QAP 
does this by outlining the process and procedures by which the DHCD 
will choose among all the competing development proposals, both by 
articulating the minimum requirements that all applicants must meet, 
induding "site requirements, developer experience, and other mea-
sures of pruject quality" and by giving higher priority to various ele-
ments of the development process.45 
This is done by constructing a ratings system that allocates various 
numbers of points to elements of the development process, project 
location, project design and services proposed to be delivered to re-
sidents, and awarding LIHTCs to those proposals with the highest 
number of points. This approach allows the state a large amount uf 
flexibility to use the federal tax credits to address its specific housing 
issues, because it can make state housing policy objectives the thresh~ 
old standards to meet when developers compete for the tax credits. 4fi 
However, the process of formulating the QAP's standards by the 
DHCD can also be ripe for "backroom dealing," developer lobbying, 
and political intrigue that favor certain- projects or policies over 
others.47 
39. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014; QAP, supra note 6, at 3. 
40. 26 U.S.C. §42 (m)(l)(A)(i). 
41. See QAP, supra note 6, at 3. The DHCD gives at least 14 days notice to the 
public that a public hearing will be held, and accepts public comments in 
writing up until the date or the hearing. fd. 
42. Id. 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
44. Zigas, supra note 4, at 52. 
45. Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 133. 
46. Jd. 
47. See infra Part IV. "For-profit developers ... may also succeed in altering state-
imposed preferences or set-asides in QAPs." Ballard, supra note 1, at 241-
42. 
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For example, politicians may find that their constituents have a 
need for more elderly housing or for more housing for persons with 
disabilities, and can request t.hat the DHCD make those particular 
housing needs a priority in the next QAP, which can give a developer 
who pledges to build that particular type of housing a competitive 
edge in the ranking process over developers who apply to build family 
housing. Or an interest group, like the construction industry, can 
lobby for more priority to be given to new construction projects over 
the rehabilitation of existing buildings, because new construction may 
be more profitable for builders. In both of these situations, "the an-
nual development of the QAP is a crucially important advocacy oppor-
tunity" that can shape who benefits from the allocation of the year's 
supply ofLIHTCs.48 Since the QAP sets the rules by which all compet-
itors must play, the yearly review and amendment process of the QAP 
is a prime opportunity for many interest groups to help shape how, 
and to whom, the next year's allotment of tax credits are distributed.49 
One way this is done is by influencing what criteria are induded in the 
QAP, and the number of points associated with each "Competitive 
Scoring Criteria."5o 
The QAP scores each pr~ject application according to certain crite-
ria, where each criterion has a certain point value assigned to it, with a 
maximum total score of 200 points .. '"'] The DHCD then ranks the pro-
posed projects based on the overall score of the application, and dis-
tributes the tax credits to the highest scoring projects.52 One 
important criterion is the physical location of the proposed develop-
ment.53 The location of affordable housing developments can help 
further a state's mission to deconcentrate poverty, improve urban 
housing stock, or jump-start economic development in a targeted 
area. 54 Two "priority project categories" in Maryland are "Family 
Housing in Communities of Opportunity" (Communities of Opportu-
nity) and "Community Revitalization and Investment Areas" (Revitali-
zation Areas).!;:> 
A project receives a large amount of the total points allotted to the 
location of a proposed development by building their housing in a 
Community of Opportunity zone, i.e. a suburban area, or a Revitaliza-
tion Area, i.e. a depressed urban area. Communities of Opportunity 
are described by the QAP as having good schools, high homeowner-
48. 
49. 
50. 
5l. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Florence Wagman Roisman, Poverty, Discrimination, and the Low-income Hous· 
ing Tax Credit Program, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKlNNEY SCH. OF u..w (Nov. 
2000), http://lllckinneyla w.iu.ed u/ instructors/ roisman/lih tcmemo. pdf. 
Jd. 
See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 47. 
See infra Appendix. 
See: infra Appendix. 
See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 56. 
Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 133. 
Program Guide, mpra note 29, at 13. 
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ship rates, low poverty rates, low property vacancy rates, low unem-
ployment rates, and school systems with high standardized test scores 
and graduation rates.56 Generally, these suburban areas are less 
densely populated and have less dense zoning in many areas than 
their urban counterparts, although their land costs may be higher. 
In contrast, Revitalization Area<; are described by the QAP as being 
located within either a Qualified Census Tract or federally designated 
Difficult to Develop Area, which are both areas that have significant 
levels of poverty and other economic challenges.57 A Qualified Cen-
sus Tract is an area designated by the Secretary of HUD where, ac-
cording to the most recent census data, 50 percent or more of the 
households have an income less than 60 percent of the AMI, or an 
area that has at least a 25 percent poverty rate. 58 Generally, these ur-
ban areas have much higher concentrations of minority residents than 
their suburban counterparts, and many times have underperforming 
school systems with low standardized test scores and graduation 
rates:~Y However, both Communities of Opportunity and Revitaliza-
tion Areas come with their own development and social challenges, 
which is discussed in Part IV.A. 
A project proportionally receives the largest amount of points based 
on the experience of its development team. uO The determining factor 
is the financial viability of the development company and the com-
pany's track record during the previous five years with comparable 
housing projects.u• This scoring criterion may reflect the desire of the 
DHCD to have stable development partners, but it may also stifle new 
companies who are unable to compete with the financial strength and 
performance of a few favored developers. However, given the relative 
complexity of successfully competing for the LlHTC and properly 
renting up and managing those projects after completion, "successful 
developers are those with experience and the capital to be able to 
withstand lengthy appEcation review periods and compliance moni-
toring .'equirement".,,62 
The QAP has general requirement.;; concerning the services a pro-
ject should provide its residents, but it does not articulate how those 
services should be delivered. It mandates that projects funded in Ma-
56. [d. at 14-16. 
57. rd. at 16; 26 U.S.c. § 42 (d) (5)(B). 
58. Philip Tegeler, Megan Haberle, & Ebony Gayles, Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing in HUD Housing Program~: A First Term Report Card, 22]. AFFORDABLE 
HouslNC & CM'lY. DEV. L. 27, 59 (2013) (citing 26 U.S.C. 
§ 42(d)(5)(B) (ii)). 
59. Seema Ramesh Shah, Harling !~ow Income Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plans 
Take Into Account the 0wlity oj Schools at Proposed Family Housing Sites: A Par-
tial An.~wer to the &sid.ential Segregation Dilemma?, 39 IND. L. REv. 691, 711 
(2006). 
60. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 50, 
61. ld. 
62. Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 134. 
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ryland must provide services "appropriate to the population served by 
the project," which is reinforced by specific scoring criteria. fi3 Obvi-
ously, elderly and special-needs housing requires some specialized ser-
vices which can raise the overall operating cost of the project, but 
even family projects must provide "passive links to appropriate com-
munity services for tenants" that will improve the "residents' ability to 
uphold their lease obligations" and "enhance the quality of life."64 
Typical community services include on-site debt counseling, job 
training programs, child care, food programs, and supplementary 
transportation (a bus that connects the property to a local transporta-
tion hub). However, no charge can be imposed on residents for these 
services, which create extra operating costs for the pr~jects and can 
lead to increasing financial distress and the potential for default on 
the project's debt. 
Finally, substantial fees may be included in the· total development 
cost of the project: fees for developers, architects, contractors, lawyers, 
and more. These fees may only be paid from equity or cash flow from 
the property itself.65 The project developer usually has his fee dis-
bursed over the a period of several years, depending on the limita-
tions imposed by LIHTC investors: Le. 25 percent at the closing of the 
deal, 25 percent after "substantial completion," and the remaining 50 
percent after the project is totally complete. fi6 In many cases, con-
struction cost overruns, slower than expected occupancy and/ or con-
version of construction to permanent loans at lower dollar amounts 
cause some portion of the development fee to be unpaid at comple-
tion and paid from project cashflow over time thereafter. Part N will 
discuss the issues of how key aspects of the program's scoring criteria 
encourages developers to build in already poor areas instead of 
spreading the projects out across a region, and how a high developer's 
fee can be a primary threat to the long-term financial viability of a 
project where it effectively eats up any additional operating income 
that could be saved for capital improvements. 57 
N. Problems With the Program 
A. The Overdevelopment oj "Revitalization Areu5" has led to Increased Geo-
graphic Segregation 
The way the QAP is currently written financially entices developers 
to build 100 percent low-income housing in already poor, urban 
neighborhoods, which exacerbates the existing geographic segrega-
tion in those neighborhoods. Many developers find that urban areas 
63. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 26. 
64. ld. at 26-27. 
65. ld. at 83. 
66. See id. at 83. 
67. See infra Part IV. 
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are lucrative locations in which to build, evidenced by the fact that 
over 50 percent of all tax credit properties are built in such areas. 68 
There are usually lower land costs, and the QAP also builds in a pretty 
substantial incentive: a project built in a Qualified Census Tract is eli-
gible to receive a 30 percent bonus in their qualified basis.6Y This 
means that if a pr~ject qualifies for the "basis boost," the total LIHTCr 
eligible costs of the project are deemed to be increased by 30 percent 
for t.he purposes of allocating the LIHTCs, thereby resulting in 30% 
additional tax credits on which cash can be raised. 70 A side effect of 
the "basis boost" is the increased financial attractiveness of urban ar-
eas as the building site of choice Jor LIHTC pr~jects, which continues 
to perpetuate racial and economic segregation in these areas. 71 
Land costs can be higher in suburban areas, and it can be difficult 
to find a piece of property suitable to building a multifamily project 
since much of the land eit.her must be rezoned for multi-family hous-
ing or is not convenient to public transportation. Furthermore, the 
QAP includes a provision where a developer must seek local commu-
nity approval for a proposed tax credit project or risk the fC:;jection of 
its application by the DHCD.72 This allows community groups op-
posed tu the development of affordable housing in their neighbor-
hood to frustrate the creation of that housing. 7~ While the power to 
veto a proposed development is available to communities in both ur-
ban and suburban areas, communities in suburban areas are typically 
the ones that oppose the expansion of affordable housing in their 
neighborhoods.74 "These [local approval] pruvisions ... lead to a con-
centration of such housing in areas with higher poverty levels."7~ 
Additionally, although federal law requires a minimum percentage 
of the units in each project be occupied by persons with certain maxi-
mum income limits for the set-aside units (i.e., the 20/50 or 40/60 
68. See Roisman, supra note 21, at 1020. 
69. See QAP, supra note 6, at 10; Karen Horn & Katherine O'Regan, The Low 
Inwme Housing Tax Credit and Racial Segregation, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL Es.-
TATE & URBAN POLlCY (May 2, 2011), http://furmancenler.org/files/publi-
cations/LlHTC_Analysis_RaciaLSegregation_Final_aILpdf. 
70. See supra not.e 28 and accompanying text. 
71. See Shah, supra note 59, at 712-13. 
72. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 7. 
73. See id. "[Wlhen residents engage in 'NIMBYIsm,' local officials will likely 
follow suit." J. William Callison, Achieving OUT Country: Geographic Desegrega-
tion and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. CALIF. REV. OF I.. &JUSTICE 
213, 256 (2010). 
74. See AJison Knezevich, Baltimore County Council Rejects Low-lncome Housing Pm· 
ject, BALTIMORJ::; SUN (Nov. 18, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 
20 13-11-18/ news/bs-md-co-housing-vote-20l31 1 18_I_housing-project-af-
foniablc-housing-baltimore-county-council (stating that. community con-
cern ahout the creation of additional affordable housing, with some 
residents receiving Section 8 vouchers, would increase crime and lower 
property values). 
75. Callison, supra note 73, at 257. 
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splil), a project gets additional points for going beyond that minimum 
by having an even larger proportion of its units be LIHTC eligible.76 
This is in part due to the wording of the Code itself, which states "each 
QAP must give preference to projects serving the lowest income te-
nants for the longest periods of time."77 It is not unusual to have en-
tire developments comprised solely of affordable rent-restricted 
units?8 Whereas the program contemplates a potential for mixed-in-
come housing developments with somewhere between 20 and 40 per-
cent of the units designated as affordable, and the rest unrestricted a'5 
to incomes and rents, this is hardly ever the case in reality, due to the 
competitiveness of yearly tax credit allocation process, where more 
points are awarded for projects with higher percentages of LlHTC-
eligible units. 7!) 
This results in the majority of projects in Maryland consisting aflOa 
percent affordable housing, turning tax credit developments into de 
facto public housing for the working poor (Le., those with incomes 
that are sufficiently high to pay the below-market rents, but not so 
high as to exceed the applicable percentage of AMI, or who usc a 
Section 8 housing voucher to pay the rent). The QAP also dictates 
that LIHTC projects must establish a priority for households on the 
waiting list for Section 8 assistance, and must make effort to refer po-
tential priority households to the project, which has the potential ef-
fect of causing more persons with little to no income to live at the 
projects and to frustrate economic integration.so 
Only recently has federal law begun requiring the collection of 
demographic information on the tenants being served by tax credit 
developments. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 re-
quires that properties that receive LIHTCs provide HUD, and HUD 
must make publicly available, "data regarding the race, ethnicity, fam-
ily composition, age, income use of rental assistance, disability status, 
and monthly rental payments" of all residents.8t The hope was that 
this data would allow HUD to evaluate the "integrative success of 
LIHTC siting" in order to determine whether these projects either 
"perpetuate segregation or affirmatively further fair housing."82 How-
ever, Congress has not yet appropriated money for the collection of 
76. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 62. 
77. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(I)(B)(ii). 
78. See Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 33, at 660. ("Since the program's in-
ception, over 95 percent of units in projects supported by the program 
qualified as low income."). 
79. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 61 ("DHCD will award points for in-
come targeting in excess of these minimum requirement~."). 
80. [d. at 24. 
81. Tegeler et aI., supra note 58, at 58. 
82. [d. 
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this data, and as of 2013, many states, including Maryland, have not 
made this data available to HUD or to the public.83 
B. The Deuewper's Fee Payment Structure Gives No Incentive to Developers to 
Continually Invest in the Properties 
Most developers of tax credit properties are for-profit entities.84 As 
Professor Ballard discusses, "For-profit developers of affordable hous-
ing grapple with a potential contradiction: On the one hand, a for-
profit entity exists in order to create a profit. On the other hand, a 
for~profit developer. . .is charged with providing housing for poor 
people who likely cannot afford to help for-profit developers generate 
excess income."85 The tension between profit and stewardship is exac-
erbated by QAP provisions that allow a developer to be paid their full 
fee during the beginning years of a project's lifespan. 
One of the biggest strengths of the program is also one of its biggest 
weaknesses: providing units to the lowest income tenants at LIHTG 
restricted rent levels does not allow the property to raise rent'> to cover 
growing expenses and capital needs as a property ages. Furthermore, 
in order to cover the debt service of a property, there is an incentive 
to keep rents a high as statutorily allowed while still complying with 
the maximum individual requirement of 30 percent of 60 percent of 
the AMI, which does not further the federal goal of providing housing 
that serves the lowest income tenants.86 This tension is palpable in 
for-profit tax credit deals, for "the program strives to house poor peo-
ple, but no one so poor that they cannot pay rents sufficient to pre-
serve a profit for the developers."H7 This effectively means creating a 
floor on the amount of income that a qualifying person must have in 
order to pay rent (i.e., the industry standard of 2 1/2 to 3 times the 
amount of rent, and leaves awhole group of people squeezed between 
the sides - too well off for public housing, yet too poor to pay for 
affordable units that were created to house them). 
Furthermore, the way that development fees get paid does not mir-
ror the sort of commitment to affordable housing that the federal 
LIHTC program contemplates. 88 The QAP allows property develop-
ers to include a maximum of a $2.5 million development fee in the 
original financial structure of an affordable housing deal, thereby 
drastically increasing the amount of debt on a property while also in-
creasing the LIHTGeligible basis of the project.89 Curiously, unlike 
the mortgage on a property (the repayment of which usually is spread 
83. [d. 
84. Ballard, supra note 1, at 212. 
85. Jd. at 233. 
86. 26U.S.C. §42 (m)(I)(B).(ii)(I). 
87. Ballard, supra note 1, at 233. 
88. See brenerally 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2013). 
89. Program Guide, supra note 29, at 35. 
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over a period of 20-30 years), or the investors' tax credit benefits 
(which are spread over a ten year period), the QAP allows a developer 
to withdraw the entire development fee once the construction of the 
property is completed - well before the property proves itself finan-
cially. Although the development fee may not be paid in full by this 
date, the QAP sets the wrong tone by not requiring that some portion 
of the development fee be paid during the same ten-year period that 
LIHTC benefits accrue to investors. The current fee-withdrawal 
schedule does not encourage any substantial accountability on the 
part of the developer to put together a deal whose finances are stable 
and realistic, and which will produce ca"h flow to support the inevita-
ble physical demands of the building over time, because the devel-
oper's priority is to get paid on the front end, well before the realities 
of an under-funded property set in. 
Furthermore, the QAP enables a developer to compromise a prop-
erty's financial viability in other ways. For example, a project must 
maintain an operating reserve equivalent to three to six months of 
operating expenses and debt service payments, which effectively cre-
ates a cash-cushion for unforeseen expensesYo However, after one 
year, a developer can draw down the operating reserve to pay out-
standing developer's fees, as long as the project continues to break-
even during the three-year operating reserve release period.91 
During the first few years of the project's lifespan, there is not a 
pressing need for the operating reserve because the physical condi-
tion of the property is still relatively new and requires little mainte-
nance. Additionally, the QAP only mandates a replacement reserve of 
only $300 per unit per year. This frees up the initial cash flow to bal-
ance the finances of the property and, therefore, payout the devel-
oper's fee. 92 When the property begins to require significant 
reinvestment, ten to 15 years into its life cycle in order to deal with 
aging systems such as windows, roofing, plumbing, kitchens, and 
baths, the $300 per unit per year replacement reserve may be inade-
quate to finance major capital expenditures, thereby leaving the prop-
erty in a vulnerable position. 
C. The Maryland UHTC Program's Focus on New Construction and 40-
Year Affrrrdability Restrictions Hurt the Ability of the Property to Remain 
Financially Healthy 
The structure of the QAP program encourages the development of 
new affordable housing, but it does not contain adequate provisions 
to preserve and maintain the physical condition of existing affordable 
housing over the term of the affordability restrictions. The poor fi-
90. Id. at 32. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
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nancial structure of an LIHTC property will eventually lead to less af-
fordable housing, not more. Deferred maintenance will cause 
systemic occupancy issues in that property, in turn, causing the prop-
erty to enter a financial tailspin, losing further rental income neces-
sary to prevent further decline. 
Although preservation of existing affordable housing is a stated pri-
ority of the QAP, in practice, the QAP favors new construction over 
the maintenance of pre-existing stmctures.9~ Only two points out of 
forty-six total points are allotted to the preservation of existing afford-
able housing in the project Scoring Summary Table, highlighting the 
low priority the QAP puts on maintaining existing housing on which 
affordability restrictions already exist.94 It is unlikely that an existing 
affordable housing property would qualify for financing over a propo-
sal for new construction. This effectively cuts off a necessary source of 
funding for affordable housing properties. 
Furthermore, Maryland's forty-year affordability restrictions may 
frustrate a property owner's ability to obtain conventional refinancing 
for better interest rates or renovations to the property, both because 
the dearth of cash available to maintain the property has resulted in 
its costly physical deterioration and deferred maintenance, and the 
pennitted LIHTC rents are restricted as to future increases by HUD 
and are not reflective of market rents. 95 Therefore, there is no assur-
ance of increased potential income for the property owner to borrow 
against, both because the property's rents cannot increase, even if it 
underwent a substantial rehabilitation (as opposed to the private mar-
ket), and because HUD is not obligated to increase LIHTC rent'i.9U 
This effectively forces the property owner to rely on a limited number 
of lenders that are willing to accept the inherent risks associated with 
LIHTC properties, or hope that future QAPs will give priority to fund-
ing existing LIHTC properties. 
V. Suggestions for Ways to Improve the Program 
A. Amend the Federal Tax Code and the Maryland QAP to Mandate Mixed-
Income Developments in Order to Increase Racial and Economic 
Integration 
The primary reason the Code granted individual states the indepen-
dence to create their own QAPs was so each state could use the tax 
credits to further their own individual housing policies and goals.97 
To this end, Maryland's QAP should be amended to reflect the goal of 
93. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 17; Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing 
and the Role oj the Low lncorM Housing Tax Credit: A ContempOTary Assessment, 
57 TAX L\w. 869, 881 (2004). 
94. See Program Guide, supra notc 29, at 53. 
95. See Ballard, supra note 1, at 235. 
96. See id. 
97. Smith & Williamson, supm note 21, at 133. 
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combating entrenched geographic segregation. In order to decrease 
the geographic segregation caused by LIHTC projects, the Code and 
Maryland's QAP must both be reformed in order to reflect more di-
verse siting and occupancy standards, which will allow LIHTC projects 
to further fair housing goals. 
One reason tax credit developers typically avoid building in subur-
ban areas is because the QAP does not offer the same financial incen-
tives as urban areas (including lower land costs and the ability to be 
eligible for additional tax credits),9s One way to combat this is to al-
low developers in suburban areas to include all or part of the land 
costs in their "eligible basis," thereby allowing them to receive some 
financial assistance with the higher land costs through the award of 
additional LIHTCs.99 Another way to combat geographic segregation 
is to amend the QAP to require a proposed project be in close prox-
imity to better-performing schools, which are included in the QAP's 
description of "Communities of Opportunity," i.e. suburban 
neighborhoods. lOo 
The QAP's scoring criteria should also be amended to cap the pro-
portion of affordable units in a project at fifty percent in order to 
ensure that each project constructed has the chance to be a vibrant, 
mixed-income community.lOl By amending the Code's provision and 
by removing the QAP's bonus points awarded to a project exceeding 
traditional affordability proportions (i.e. the 40/60 split), Maryland 
can encourage economic desegregation with each new project 
built. 102 
Additionally, multiple academics advocate that since the tax credits 
are originated by the Treasury Department, the Treasury should take 
a more active role in ensuring the distribution of LIHTCs "affirma-
tively furthers" fair housing. lUg This would give the individual states 
an additional layer of accountability when amending their QAPs to 
reflect the priority of geographic desegregation. In order for the 
Treasury to act, it first needs to affirmatively enforce the provisions in 
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that mandates the 
collection of demographic data from each project receiving 
LIHTCs. 104 This would allow the Treasury to create a map of all ex-
isting LIHTC projects and require the DHCD to assess how each new 
98. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
100. Callison, supra note 73, at 255. 
] 01. See supra note 79 an d accom panyi ng text; Program Guide, supra note 29, at 
6l. 
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (m)(l)(A) (ii); Program Guide, supra note 29, at 61. 
103. See Callison, supra note 73, at 254; Orfield, supra note 19, at 1777; Roisman, 
supra note 21, at 1042; Tegeler et al., supra note 58, at 60. 
104. Tegeler ct aI., supra note 58, at 58. 
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project proposal would affect the demographics in its proposed 
location. 105 
B. Disburse the Developer's Fee Over a Longer Period of Time so as to Create 
Incentive to Continually Invest in the Properties 
It is simple to give academic suggestions for how to fix a compli-
cated housing finance program, but that seldom leads to practical 
solutions. 
This paper suggests the following measures in order to solve the 
problem of a developer's fee draining the coffers of a property before 
the foreseeable physical needs of the property have been cared for: 
1) At least 25% of the developer'S fee should be paid during the ten 
year LIHTC period only from cash flOW10li in excess of the amount 
needed to fund 120% of property debt service - longer than the 
"break-even" period required by the Program Guide. 107 
2) Replacement reserves for each property should be increased at 
an annual rate (i.e. 5%) sufficient to build up adequate reserves for 
each property when needed in years 11-20. 
3) The guarantor of LIHTC compliance during the first fifteen 
years should be required to liquet)' some portion of its funding obliga-
tion (i.e. 25%) with cash or a letter of credit, which would give it in-
centive to cause the project to be constructed with more durable 
building materials and to monitor maintenance of the project in or-
der to protect against poor marketability of units due to their deterio-
rated condition. 
These changes would most likely narrow down the list of developers 
willing to take part in LIHTC projects, but since the yearly LIHTC 
allocation competition in Maryland always has more competitors than 
available credits, this is a risk worth taking that could be successfully 
mitigated. IOH 
C. Create a Framework Where far-Profit and Non-Profit Developers can own 
and Operate an Affordable Housing Property in Stages, so that the Prop-
erty is Ensured Proper Maintenance Over Time 
For-profit developers are in this business to make a profit, and pro-
viding affordable housing just happens to be the vehicle to accom-
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
Roisman, supra note 21, at 1042. 
The Program Guide defines cashflow as property net revenues after pay-
ment of all operating expenses and funding all required reseIl'Cs. See Pro-
gram Guide, supra note 29, at 56. 
Program Guide, supra note 29, at 31. 
See 2012 Multifamily Housing Notice 12-12, MD. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND CMIT. 
DEV., http://dhcd.maryland.gov/Website/programs/rhf/notices/notice_ 
12_12.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 20 J 3). DHCD received 21 applications and 
granted 13 of them in 2012, and in 2011 they received 29 applications [or 
LIHTC projects. !d. 
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plish that goal. 109 On the other hand, non-profit developers are often 
"mission-driven to provide affordable housing" and often have long" 
term success managing LIHTC developments years after the initial 
fees have been paid out. lIO However, studies have shown that for-
profit developers are able to produce a LIHTC unit at a substantially 
lower initial cost than non-profit developers. I I I 
The profit motive of the for-profit developer can be used as an asset 
instead of a liability to the long-term financial health of an affordable 
housing project. For-profit developers can get things built, and more 
importantly, many for-profit developers are vertically integrated.112 
One company has in-house architects, land developers, contractors, 
and lawyers - all of which can streamline the process and keep the 
prospective costs of a project down.1l3 As a compliment to for"profit's 
efficiency, non-profits bring a different set of priorities to the table, 
priorities that match the long-term physical and financial needs of af-
fordable housing projects. 
The logical answer is some sort of cooperative effort: for-profit de-
velopers build the property, lease it up, and get it running, and non-
profits step in at year ten to fifteen to purchase the property and run 
it for its duration (or longer) .114 This allows the for-profit entity to 
continue doing what they do best - developing housing - while non-
profits can provide the sort of commitment and stability that these 
existing properties require in order to continue to financially 
perform.11 fl 
VI. Conclusion 
Providing the right kind of affordable housing to millions of needy 
Americans is an important task, one that should be about more than 
generating profits. LIHTCs are important to many property develop-
ers, for they can be the difference between a project being built and 
109. See Smith and Williamson, supra note 21, at 136 ("For-profit owners have a 
strong focus on the financial bottom line and aim for maximization of in-
vestment returns."). 
110. Id. 
111. Ballard, supra note 1, at 236. The General Accounting Office estimates that 
the average cost of one LlHTC unit built by a for-profit developer is about 
$18,000 less than one built by a non-profit developer. U.S. GEN. Ace. OFF., 
TAX CREDITS: REASONS FOR COST DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING BUILT BY FOR-
PROFIT ANO NON-PROFIT DEVELOPERS I (1999). 
112. See Moore, supra note 18, at 1. 
113. Id. 
114. Ballard, supra note 1, at 237. In contrast to most for-profit developers, non-
profits traditionally maintain higher operating reserves to support sus-
tained low-income use. Id. 
115. Although non-profits have employees and costs, just like for-profits, their 
directors arc limited in the amount of money that they can withdraw from 
the deal at one time (unlike for-profit developers), which typically limit the 
non-profit developer's inclination to leave a project financially strapped ill 
order to increase personal profits. 
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not. Therefore, stricter distribution guidelines should be adopted by 
the state to reflect just what a powerful tool tax credits can be. If ad-
ministered correctly, tax credit~ can be a real force for positive change 
in a community, and can serve to develop more than just one project; 
they can also sen'e to redevelop a community for generations to come. 
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Appendix: 
Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development 
Multifamily Rental Financing Program Guide Page 53 
Scoring Summary Table 
5.1 Capacity of Development Team 
5.1.1 Development Team Experience 
5.1.2 Deductions from Team Experience Score 
5.1.3 Developer Financial Capaci ty 
5.1.4 Nonprofits (NPs) 
5.2 Community Context 
5.2.1 Community Impact Projects 
5.2.2 Communities of Opportunity 
5.2.3 Transit Oriented Development 
5.2.4 Rehab of Existing Properties 
5.3 Public Purpose 
5.3.1 Income Targeting 
5.3.2 Targeted Populations: Non-Elderly PWD 
or Special Needs 
5.3.3 Family Housing 
5.3.4 Tenant Services 
5.3.5 Mixed Income Housing 
5.3.6 Preseniation of Existing Affordable 
Housing 
5.4 Leveraging and Cost-Effectiveness 
5.4.1 Direct Levera!,,, ng 
5.4.2 Operating Subsidies 
5.4.3 Construction or Rehabilitation Cost 
Incentives 
5.5 Development Quality 
5.5.1 Green Features 
5.5.2 Brownfields Redevelopment 
5.5.3 Energy and Water Conservation 
5.5.4 Site and Building Design 
5.6 State Bonus Points (maximum oflO 
points) # 
Total 
Maximum Possible Points 
74 Total Points 
42 points 
. ]0 points 
18 points 
14 point~ 
28 Total Points 
16 points* 
16 pOints* 
8 points 
4 points 
46 Total Points 
14 points 
10 points 
8 points 
8 point~ 
4 points 
2 points 
20 Total Points 
10 points 
10 points 
- 8 points 
32 Total Points 
12 points 
1 point 
4 points 
15 points 
See note 
200 
*Project cannot receive points under both CommuniLy Impact and Communities of 
Opportunity categories. 
#Statt;; Bonus Points may be awarded outside of the 200 point scale 
